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Abstract—Modularization is an important architectural prin-
ciple underlying many types of complex systems. It tends to tame
the complexity of systems, to facilitate their management, and to
enhance their flexibility with respect to evolution. In software,
modularization has been practiced and studied thoroughly in
local, i.e. non-distributed systems. But very little attention has
been paid so far to modularization in distributed systems. This is,
in part, because distributed systems are inherently modularized,
in the sense that the internals of each component of such a
system is inaccessible to other components, thus satisfying the
Parnas hiding principle. It is, however, the thesis of this paper
that there is much to be gained by being able to treat groups
of distributed components as modules, called here distributed
modules. And that besides the conventional hiding principle,
distributed modularization should provide additional capabilities,
which rarely, if ever, figure in conventional modularized systems.
These capabilities include, but are not limited to: the ability
to impose constraints on which kind of messages can be sent
from a given distributed-module to its outside; and the ability to
create AOP-like crosscutting modules. This paper introduces a
model of modular distributed system, or MDS, which satisfies such
capabilities, and which is implemented via the LGI middleware.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modularization is an important architectural principle un-
derlying many types of complex systems. It tends to tame
the complexity of systems, to facilitate their management, and
to enhance their flexibility with respect to evolution. Indeed,
modularity is clearly manifested in biological systems, and
it has been employed in many types of physical artifacts.
In software, modularization has been practiced and studied
thoroughly in local, i.e. non-distributed1, systems. And the
constraints required for effective modularization in such sys-
tems is usually supported by programming languages.
But very little attention has been paid so far to modu-
larization in distributed systems. This is, in part, because
distributed systems are inherently modularized, in the sense
that the internals of each component of such a system is
inaccessible to other components, thus satisfying the Parnas
[9] hiding principle. This may seem to be a sufficient degree
of modularization. And, it may not be obvious what other kind
of modularization is relevant, or even possible, in distributed
systems. Indeed, the literature seems to be silent on this issue.
1We prefer the term “local” over the more common, but somewhat awk-
ward, “non-distributed”systems.
It is, however, the thesis of this paper that there is much
to be gained by being able to treat groups of distributed
components as modules, which we call distributed modules (or
d-modules for short). In an analogy to conventional modules,
a d-module should be able to hide its “internals,” by which we
mean that only specified component parts of a given module—
i.e., the distributed components that belong to this module—
can be reached via a specified types of messages from the rest
of the system. Moreover, we maintain that distributed modu-
larization should provide some additional capabilities, which
rarely, if ever, figure in conventional modularized systems.
These capabilities include: (1) The ability to limit access to the
internals of a given module to certain part of the system. (2)
The ability to impose constraints on which kind of messages
can be sent from a given d-module to its outside. (3) The
ability of different modules to overlap with each other. And
(4) the ability to construct modules that implement AOP-like
crosscutting concerns.
Such distributed modularization, we maintain, is particularly
important for the increasingly fragmented distributed systems,
consisting of highly heterogeneous components dispersed over
the Internet, which may be written in different languages,
may run on different kinds platforms, and may be designed,
constructed, and even maintained under different administra-
tive domains. We refer to such systems as having an open
architecture, or simply being open2. For a prominent example
of this class of systems consider the concept of service
oriented architecture [8] (SOA)—which is being adopted by
a wide range of complex distributed systems, such as enter-
prise systems, federations such as grids, virtual organizations
(VOs), and supply chains.
The question is how to formulate and enforce the constraints
on communication between system components, which is re-
quired for establishing distributed modularization. This cannot
be done by means of programming language, as the various
components of a given distributed system may be written in
many different languages. And it cannot be done by controlling
the code of the various components—particularly not in open
systems—because one may have no access to the code of many
of them, and no ability to control such codes.
2The term “open system,” as used here, has nothing to do with the concept
of open source.
It is, however, possible to enforce the required constraints on
communication between components by means of a suitable
middleware that is oblivious of the code of the communicating
components, and is thus independent of it. Using such a
middleware, we introduce in this paper a model of a modular
distributed system, or MDS, which possesses the capabilities
outlined above. And we provide a proof of concept for this
model via an experimental implementation of it.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
motivates the need for distributed modularization via two
examples. Section III introduces basic set of requirements
that an MDS, and its implementation, needs to satisfy to be
effective. Section IV discusses the type of middleware required
for the implementation of our concept of MDS, and describe
the specific middleware we use for this purpose. Section V
describes a basic model of MDS; and Section VI extends
this simplified model to our complete MDS model. Finally,
Section VII outlines some open problems by our model of
MDS; and we conclude in Section VIII.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
We consider here two examples of groups of components of
a distributed system that provide a motivation for distributed
modularization, and suggest some of the properties it should
have.
A Monitoring Service: Consider a monitoring service (MS)
designed for the management of large and geographically
distributed system S. The function of this service is to log
various events occurring in S, analyze them, and provide
reports about the results of this analysis to certain qualified
components of S; and to certain Internet cites outside of S,
such as cites that represent outside auditors.
Suppose that MS consists of a group of components within
S, partitioned into three disjoint sets: (1) the logs that accept
and maintains various types of logging notices about events
occurring in different parts of system S; (2) the analyzers
that analyze the various logs, for various purposes; and (c)
the reporters, who prepare reports of various results of this
analysis for stakeholders such as auditors, managers, and
performance optimizers—inside the system, or outside of it.
Suppose also that the APIs of these components provide
the following operations, among others, intended for the use
of clients outside of the MS group. The logs feature the
operations: (a) store. which logs a given event, and (b)
retrieve, which gets some information from a log. And
the reporters feature and operation disclose which sends
to the requester the type of reports it requires, if it is deemed
to have the right for it.
Now, it should be clear that the information handled by the
MS group of components could be very sensitive, depending
on the nature of the system S itself. So that the integrity and
confidentiality of this information could be critical and should
be protected. One way to provide such protection is to ensure
that the following constraint on communication of components
of MS with the rest of the Internet are strictly enforced.
• The retrieve operation of logs should not be visible
outside the MS group. (This is because the raw data
in logs may be very sensitive, and should not reveled,
uninterpreted, to anybody outside of MS. It should, of
course, be accessible to other components of MS itself.)
• The disclose operation of reporters, is to be visible
only to certain clients, inside S or outside of it, that repre-
sent stakeholder (such as auditors, and system managers)
that have the need to get logging reports, and have the
right (however defined) to see them.
• No other communication between components of MS and
Internet cites outside of S is permitted.
• All other APIs provided by the components of MS are
for internal use, and must be hidden from the rest of the
system.
Distributed Sandbox: Systems need sometimes to use un-
trusted code—untrusted because the code has been developed
by untrusted third parties, or if it is a newly developed part of
the system, which has not been fully tested yet. The safety of
the host system requires that the communication of such code
with the rest of the host system, and with the Internet outside
of the system, be carefully circumscribed and monitored. More
specifically, one generally needs to impose constraints on
which part of the host system can send what kind of messages
to the untrusted code. And, perhaps more importantly, one
need to constraint the kind of messages that the untrusted code
can send to the rest of the host system.
In local systems this is accomplished by placing the un-
trusted code in what has come to be known as a sandbox,
whose interaction with the host system is strictly constraints.
Such constraints are generally imposed either by the language
in which the host system and the untrusted code are written,
or by the platform on which the system runs.
But when dealing with a distributed system, where the
untrusted code can be distributed as well, we do not have
a programming language to rely on establishing a sandbox,
as different system components can be written in different
languages. Nor can we rely on the platforms on which com-
ponents run, as there may be many different platforms used
by the system.
III. DESIRABLE PROPERTIES OF MODULAR DISTRIBUTED
SYSTEMS
As a first step towards the introduction of our model of a
modular distributed system (MDS) we describe in this section
some of the properties that such a system should satisfy. These
properties are realized by our basic model of MDS introduced
in Section V, which is a special case of the complete MDS
model introduced in Section VI.
We start this section with a schematic description of the
structure of an MDS, along with the terminology to be used
throughout this paper. We then characterize and motivate the
type of controls that one may want to impose over the flow
of messages into d-modules and from them. And we conclude
with some basic properties that the implementation of an MDS
should satisfy.
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Fig. 1. Various types of message flows with respect to a component c of a
module M
A. The Basic Concepts and Terminology of MDS:
Schematically, an MDS is a set of distributed components
grouped into a disjoint3 set of d-modules. (We will often refer
to a d-module simply as a module, while the conventional
language-based module will be referred to as as a traditional
module). Every d-module is composed of a set of one or more
distributed components. But this is not a physical composition,
but a logical one; having to do with the constraints on
communication imposed on all component parts of a module.
The modules of a given MDS are identified uniquely by their
names, and each module can carry a profile consisting of an
arbitrary list of labels. A module that contains just a single
component is called a singleton.
We use the following notation for various structural aspects
of a given MDS S. Specific modules of S are denoted by
capitalized symbols, such as M , N , or Mi; and individual
components of S are denoted by lower case symbols such as
c, d, or ci. A component c that belongs to moduleM is denoted
by cM ; and the complement of module M with respect to the
entire system S, is denoted by M . Finally, actors operating
over the Internet that do not belong to S are called the outside
of S, denoted by outside(S).
Due to the focus of MDS on the flow of messages into and
out of modules, we introduce the following notations about
flow of messages with respect to a given module M of S:
•inflow(M) is the receipt by a component of M
of a message sent from somewhere in M ;
•outflow(M) is the sending by a component of M
of a message addressed to some components in M ;
•import(M) is the receipt by a component of M
of a message sent from somewhere in outside(S);
3This is a simplification, d-modules do not have to be disjoint under our
complete MDS model.
•export(M) is the sending by a component of M of
a message addressed to somewhere in outside(S).
•innerF low(M) is the exchange of a message
between the components of M ;
These types of flows are depicted in Figure 1, which represents
a system S whose components are partitioned into two types:
(a) the components that belong to a module M , depicted by
ovals: and (b) the rest of the components of S, depicted by
squares. Also, shown, by irregular forms, two actors outside
of S, somewhere over the Internet. Note that the components
of M , in this figure, are intermixed with the other components
of S, with no physical boundary that marks them as belonging
to a single module—we shall see in Section V what makes a
group of components into a module. The five types of flow
defined above are depicted in this figure by different forms of
arrows directed into a specific component c of M , or away
from it.
B. Control Over the Flow of Messages in an MDS
The main purpose of modularization of distributed systems
is to control the flow of messages into and out of the various
modules of a system. The following is a presentation of
the controls we require over the various types message-flow
identified above. The definition of each of this type of control
is followed by a discussion written in italics, and enclosed in
a pair of curly brackets.
• Inflow Control: The imposition of constraints over which
component of M can receive which kind of messages
from which other modules of S.
{Discussion: This control is analogous to the conven-
tional concept of interface of the traditional modules.
But it is significantly more general than the interface
supported by most programming languages, in the follow-
ing sense: While the conventional interface makes certain
methods of a module visible everywhere in the system, the
inflow control under MDS can make certain APIs of a
module accessible only to specified modules. The need
for such selective accessibility has been demonstrated
in Section II by the monitoring service (MS) example,
where the disclose operation is to be accessible only
to selected modules. Indeed such selective accessibility
is featured by Eiffel [4], where it is called “selective
export,” but most programming languages do not support
this capability.}
• Outflow Control: The imposition of constraints over
which component of M can send which kind of messages
to which other modules of S.
{ Discussion: While inflow control—the only control
provided by traditional modularization—is effective in
protecting the internals of a given module M from the
rest of the system (namely from M ) it does not protect M
from M . Because the inflow control leaves the internals
of M free to send arbitrary messages to components in
M , which may change the behavior of the system in
unpredictable manner. This means, in particular, that the
statement often made about conventional modularization
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that the hidden internal of a module can be changed
freely without affecting the system—as long as the public
interface is implemented correctly—is not justified. This
problem is particularly stark in the case of untrusted
code discussed in Section II, which needs to be placed
in a sandbox to protect the system against it. But outflow
control can address this problem quite effectively.}
• Export and Import Control: The imposition of con-
straints over which component of M can send (or receive)
which kind of messages to (or from) outside(S).
{Discussion: An example of the potential importance of
such control over the communication of a module with
the outside of the system is provided by the monitoring
service (MS) example in Section II. The MS group of
components contains sensitive information that needs to
be shared with certain specific actors outside of the
system, but should not be leaked to anybody else over
the Internet.
In conventional distributed systems such controls is pro-
vided by firewalls. But exercising such controls under an
MDS has several important advantage over the firewall
base control. In particular, a single set of constraints,
specified at a level of a module, can replace a whole
collection of distributed firewalls. }
• InnerFlow control: The imposition of constraints over
the exchange of messages among the components of
module M .
{Discussion: Since the components belonging to a given
module may be constructed and managed under differ-
ent administrative domains, one may want to impose
constraints over their interaction. In the case of the
monitoring service of Section II, for example, one may
want the reporters, which are supposed to get their
information from the analyzers, not to have a direct
access to the logs, lest they reveal raw data that needs
to be private. It should be pointed out that out of all the
control types presented here, this is probably the only one
that is irrelevant to local systems.}
C. Required Properties of the Implementation of MDS:
We introduce and motivate below three key requirements
from any implementation of the concept of MDS.
(R1) Independence of the Modular Structure of an MDS
from the Code of System Components: Modularization
in distributed systems should be independent of the code
of the components of the system, and of the programming
languages in which they are written. The constraint on the
flow of messages should be enforced by a middleware that
views the components as communicating black boxes. The
reasons for this requirement are: (a) the code of different
components may be written in many different languages,
and is not generally available for inspection and for control
by any single mechanism; and (b) the modularization-based
constraints should be invariant of the evolution of the code.
(R2) Modularity of the Specification of the Modular
Structure of an MDS: The specification of the constraints on
the message flow into a given module, and out of it, should
be completely independent of such specification with respect
to other modules.
(R3) Local Control: The control over the flow of messages
into or from a given component c of a given module M should
be carried out locally, at c—or be carried out by a device
dedicated to mediate the interaction of c with others. In other
words, the control over flow into and out of a component cM
should not be done by a mediator that represent module M ,
mediating the message flow of all components of M . Because
the existence of a mediator for each module would complicate
the system, and reduce the efficiency of mediation (This is
particularly true in the presence of hierarchy of modules under
the complete MDS model, to be discussed in Section VI.)
Also, this control should not be carried out via a system-wide
mediator, because such a mediator would constitute a single
point of failure and an obvious target for attacks; and it would
be unscalable to boot. Moreover, a system-wide mediator
would be inconsistent with the R2 requirement above.
IV. ON A MIDDLEWARE UNDERLYING MODULAR
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
The function of the middleware in the context of an MDS
is to enable the formulation of constraints over the messaging
activities of distributed components, and to carry out the
enforcement of such constraints. Since messages are the means
for interaction between distributed components, we call such
constraints interaction-laws or simply laws. And as we shall
see in Section V-A, we will define a d-module to be the set
of components whose interactive activities are governed by a
specific interaction-law—which makes such laws central to our
concept of MDS. The following are some key requirements,
regarding interaction-laws, posed by our concept of MDS.
1) The enforcement of interaction-laws needs to be decen-
tralized, for several reasons: (a) to realize the require-
ment R2 and R3 above; (b) for the sake of scalability;
and (c) to avoid having a single point of failure, and a
critical target for attacks.
2) Interaction-laws need to be stateful, so they can be
sensitive to the history of interaction. (This aspect of
interaction-laws is required for MDS for dealing with
crosscutting concerns, that involve coordination between
system components, as hinted in Section VI-D.)
3) It should be possible to impose multiple interaction-
laws over a single distributed system in order to rep-
resent different modules, independently of each other.
And these laws need to interoperate seamlessly, and
be organized into what we call conformance hierarchy.
(This requirement will be explained and motivated in
due course.)
We employ here a middleware called law governed interaction
(LGI) that fulfills these requirements. Although LGI has been
published extensively, there is no single paper that describe all
the above mentioned properties of it. We outline, therefore, the
LGI mechanism below, paying particular attention to how it
satisfies the above requirements.
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A. The Law-Governed Interaction (LGI) Middleware—an
Overview:
LGI is a middleware that can govern the interaction (via
message exchange) between distributed actors, by enforcing
an explicitly specified law—and possibly multiple laws—
about such interaction. By the term “actor” we mean here an
arbitrary autonomous process of computation, whose structure
and behavior is left unspecified, and is viewed as a black
box by LGI. Thus, an actor can be such things as a software
component, an hardware device, or a person communicating
via a smart-phone.
We provide here a brief, and rather abstract, overview of
LGI; focusing on the properties of it which are the most
relevant to this paper. A more detailed presentation of LGI,
and a tutorial of it, can be found in its manual [5]—which
describes the release of an experimental implementation of the
main parts of LGI. For additional information and examples
the reader is referred to a host of published papers4, some of
which will be cited explicitly in due course.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. We start, in
Section IV-A1 with the local nature of the laws supported by
LGI—a key characteristics of this middleware, which underlies
the above mentioned properties. In Section IV-A2 we describe
the law enforcement mechanism of LGI. And in Section IV-A3
we discuss the need for multitude of laws, and the hierarchical
organization of such laws.
1) The Local Nature of Interaction Laws Under LGI::
Although the purpose of interaction laws is to govern the
exchange of messages between different distributed actors,
they do not do so directly under LGI. Rather, a law governs
the interactive activities of any actors operating under it, in
particular, by imposing constraints on the messages that such
an actor can send and receive. The ruling of such a law for an
interactive event that may occur at any actor x—such as the
sending of a message by x, or the arrival of a message at it—
can depend on the interactive state, of the actor in question, by
which we mean, some function of the history of interaction
of this actor with the rest of the system. The exchange of
messages between two actors, is therefore, governed by the
laws under which each of them operates, which may or may
not be the same law, as we shall see.
This types of laws are local in the sense that they can be
enforced locally, with no knowledge of, or dependency on,
the interactive state of any other actor of the system. This
means that the exchange of a message between two actors
requires their respective laws to be enforced separately, first
at the sender of the message, and then at its receiver. Such
decentralized enforcement, is, of course, very scalable, even
for highly stateful laws. Note that without locality one would
need to employ a central mediator (or reference monitor)
to mediate the interactions between all actors, as it is done
under conventional AC mechanisms, such as XACML. And
interaction via a central mediator is inherently unscalable for
4These papers are available at http://www.cs.rutgers.edu/∼minsky/pubs.html.
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Fig. 2. Interaction between a pair of LGI-agents, mediated by a pair of
controllers under possibly different laws.
stateful policies. (This is the case even if the mediator is
replicated, as has been shown in [7].)
2) The Law Enforcement Mechanism of LGI:: The LGI
law-enforcement is carried out, broadly, as follows: For an
actor x to conduct its interactive activities under a given law
L, it needs to adopt a software entity called controller to serve
as its private mediator, subject to law L. The controller itself
is generic, as it is able to operate under any well formed
LGI-law. So its adoption by x involves loading the specific
law L into it, which creates a pair 〈x, TLx 〉, where TLx is the
controller mediating the interactive activities of x under law
L. This pair is called an L-agent, since its interactive behavior,
as seen by other actors, is forced to conform to law L. (Note
that the act of adoption is one of the interactive events of
LGI, which signifies the birth of an agent, which may be
followed by an initialization procedure, as require by the law.)
The trustworthiness of the controllers is discussed in [5].
Figure 2 depict the manner in which a pair of actors,
operating via different controllers,, under possible different
laws, interact with each other. Note that, depending on security
considerations, the controllers may reside on the hosts of their
respective actors, or they may be anywhere over the Internet,
but managed by a controller service (CoS).
On the Performance of LGI: An extensive study of the
overhead incurred due to the use of LGI has been reported
in [7], indicating that this overhead is generally reasonably
small. The evaluation of the law takes about 50µs, using a
fairly standard PC, and for a relatively simple laws, of the
kind one expect to use for MDS. This is often negligible,
particularly for communication over WAN.
3) About the Concept of Conformance Hierarchy of Laws::
As noted at the top of Section IV, an MDS-based system
would need to be governed by multiple laws, organized into,
what we call, a conformance hierarchy, which we denote by H
In fact such organization of laws is required for many complex
applications, and it is supported by LGI. Here we provide only
a brief outline of this concept. For a formal and more detailed
description of conformance hierarchies of laws the reader is
referred to [1].
The Structure of a Conformance Hierarchy of Laws:: A
conformance hierarchy H is a tree of laws rooted by a law LR,
such that every law L′ in H , except its root law, is derived from
its superior law L via a derivation mechanism that ensures that
L′ conforms to L—in the sense to be described below—and
that this conformance is transitive.
Rather than using a uniform definition of conformance—
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such as requiring that a subordinate law can deviate from
its parent only by being more restrictive than it, which is
a common view concerning access control policies—we let
each law define what it means for its subordinates to conform
to it. This is done as follows: For a law to belong to a law
hierarchy it needs to have two different parts, which we call
the ground part and the meta part. The ground part of a law
L imposes constraints on interactive behavior of the actors
operating directly under this law. While the meta part of L
circumscribes the extent to which a laws subordinate to L are
allowed to deviate from the ground provisions of it.
As a simple example, the root law LR may prohibit all
interaction between components, while enabling subordinate
laws to permit any kind of interaction under their purview.
Alternatively, law LR may permit all interaction, while en-
abling subordinate laws to prohibit selected interactions.
This very flexible concept of conformance is somewhat
analogous to the manner in which state laws in the US conform
to the federal laws. And such conformance turns out to be very
useful for the governance of complex distributed systems as
well, as we shall see in Section V-B.
The Formation of a Conformance Hierarchy of Laws::
A conformance hierarchy H is formed incrementally via a
recursive process described informally below. First one creates
the root law LR of H . Second, given a law L already in H ,
one defines a law L′, subordinate to L, by means of a law-
like text called delta, denoted by ∆(L,L′), which specifies
the intended differences between L′ and L. This is done in a
manner that ensures that law L′ conforms to its superior law
L—for a formal model of this derivation see [1].
V. A BASIC MODEL OF MDS
An MDS, according to this basic model, is a triple
〈C,H,E〉, where C is a set of distributed components that
populate the system; H is a conformance hierarchy of laws
(also called the law ensemble) that defines the modular struc-
ture of a system; and E is the LGI-based mechanism that
enforces the laws of H , thus establishing this structure.
The only assumption made by this model about the com-
ponents of C is that they all communicate via LGI, subject
to laws in H . We will justify this assumption in Section V-C,
under certain conditions, and will qualify it when these condi-
tions are not satisfied. The law ensemble H is bi-level under
this basic model, but as we shall see in Section VI, it can be
extended to arbitrary depth. And the enforcement mechanism
E is a middleware consisting of LGI controllers that mediate
the interaction between the components of S, subject to the
various laws in H .
The rest of this section is organized as follows: we start with
the gist of this model, which explains how modules of MDS
are to be defined, and how the overall modular structure of
a system is established. Section V-B is a rather generic case
study that illustrates how the modular structure of an MDS
is defined. Section V-C elaborates on our assumption that the
laws in H are strictly enforced; and Section V-D discusses the
construction of an MDS.
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Fig. 3. An Hierarchical Law-Ensemble of an MDS
A. The Gist of MDS:
The key concept of MDS is that of a distributed module,
defined below:
Definition 1: A distributed module M of an MDS S is a
set of components of S that communicate with others subject
to an interaction-law LM that belong to the lawp ensemble H
of S.
This definition of a module via a law under which its compo-
nents communicate, has several important implications. First,
it provides an unambiguous definition of the composition of
modules—namely, the set of modules that operate under this
law. Second, law LM is in a position to impose constraints
on the flow of messages into and from each component c of
M . These constraints are enforced locally at c; due to the
decentralized nature of LGI, and according to requirement R3
of Section III-C. Third, this definition provide great flexibility
to this model, facilitating such things as and the ability of
modules to overlap—which is a feature of the complete MDS
model. (Note also that under the LGI-terminology, a module
M , thus defined, is precisely the LM -community.)
Such module-laws can be defined independently of each
other, and according to requirement R2 of Section III-C. But
there must be some similarities between these laws, for the
interaction between modules to be coherent. For example,
there must be some common way for interacting components
to identify the names of the modules to which they belong.
And one may want some constraints on the flow of messages
to apply to all modules of a given system. We refer to such
commonalities as regularities of the system.
Under this model regularities are established, by having all
module-laws, such as LM above, subordinate to a single law,
which serves as the root law of an hierarchical law ensemble
H . Such a law ensemble is depicted in Figure 3. It is a bi-
level5 hierarchy, whose root law is denoted but LS , where S
is the name of the system at hand. The individual laws in this
hierarchy are maintained by what is called a law server, which
ensures that the name given to these laws are unique.
Given such a law ensemble designed for an MDS system
S, and a set C of components, the system itself is constructed
by having each component c in C that is intended to belong
5Note that this figure contains laws situated below the second level—they
are depicted by dashed lines. Such laws are possible under the complete model
of MDS, which supports law hierarchies of arbitrary depth.
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to module M , adopt an LGI controller with law LM that
defines this module. The interactive activities of c would then
be governed by law LM of the module to which it belongs;
and, indirectly, by the root law LS to which law LM conforms
due to the hierarchical structure of H . A system of this kind
is depicted schematically in Figure 4—which is an elaboration
of Figure 1. It shows two modules, called M and K , whose
components are dispersed over the Internet (the components
belonging to module M are represented in this figure by
ovals, and those belonging to K are represented by triangles.).
There is no physical boundary enclosing the members of
a module; their membership is defined by the laws—LM
and LK , respectively—under which they communicate. This
figure also depicts the various flow of messages into and from
components c of module M .
It is worth pointing out here that this basic model provides
no control over which components can belong to which
modules, but such control is provided by the complete MDS
model, introduced in Section VI.
An important consequence of this model is that modules
have no physical embodiment. Rather, a modules is defined as
a set of of components whose interactive activity is governed
by the same law. And as required in Section III-C, the
enforcement of the law of a module is carried out by the private
controller associated with each component. The only physical
manifestation of a module is its law, which is maintained at
the controllers of the various components operating under it,
and at the law-server.
Finally, it should be pointed out that a singleton module
N , i.e., a module that contains a single component c has
advantages over a having c not be contained in this module.
Because the law LN of N can provides guarantees to the
rest of the system that cannot be obtained otherwise. This, by
limiting the outflow and the export and import that can be
carried out by N .
B. Establishing the Modular Structure of an MDS—a Generic
Case Study:
To illustrate how a modular structure of an MDS can be
defined by its law ensemble H—and enforced by E—we
describe here the law ensemble of a more or less generic case
study.
The various laws in H are described here broadly and
informally. A reader who wishes to see how such laws are
actually written under LGI is referred to [1], where a fairly
sophisticated hierarchical ensemble of laws is introduced in
details. Here are some comments about our informal descrip-
tion of H . A typical law consists of several rules, which
represent different provisions regarding different aspects of the
modular structure. And all but the root law of this hierarchy
are represented by their deltas, which specify the differences
between the law at hand and its superior. We employ here
the following convention about the meta6 part of any given
law L in the hierarchy: (a) if L has a rule that addresses a
certain aspect of messaging activity of a component subject to
this law—such as the sending of a certain type of message—
then this rule cannot be deviated from by subordinate (and
transitively subordinate) laws of L, unless such deviation is
explicitly permitted by the meta part of L—such meta per-
missions are denoted by bracketed text in bold italic font; and
(b) if L has nothing to say about certain aspect of interaction,
then subordinate laws have the freedom of legislation about
it. We start with law LS , and then continue with an example
of a module-law subordinate to it.
1) The Root Law LS of H:: Due to the conformance nature
of the hierarchical law ensemble H , its root law LS has domin-
ion over all the laws in H . Consequently, this law governs all
the messaging activities of components of the system at hand7.
Some of the rules of this law are stated categorically, not
allowing any deviation from them by the subordinate module-
laws—thus establishing system regularities. Other rules in this
law, which permit deviations from them by module laws, can
be viewed as establishing defaults. Note that most of the rules
below are followed by a discussion—in italics enclosed in
curly brackets—that elaborates on the rule, providing some
clarification of it and motivation for it.
1) Initialization: The name M of the module-law LM that
has been adopted by a component c is to be stored in
the state of its adopted LGI-controller.
[But the module-law itself may add conditions to this
rule, and may require various operations to be carried
6The concepts of delta and of meta part of a law have been introduced in
Section IV-A3.
7This is true under the assumption made at the top of Section V, that
all message exchange in the system is done under laws in H—but see
Section V-C for an elaboration of this assumption.
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out upon adoption, perhaps for adding information
that further identifies the module.]
{Discussion: Having the unique name of a module,
represented at every component of it, is essential for
flow control as is explained in the context of Rule 2
below. }
2) Sender identification: Every message sent is to be
concatenated with the name and profile of the module
to which the sender-component belongs. This identifier
is to be stripped from the message, before it is delivered
to the target component itself.
{Discussion: This sender identification is needed by the
receiver of the message, for it to be able to determine if
this message satisfies its own inflow-control rules, and
thus aught to be accepted—the profile can be specified
by the module law, as discussed in Section V-B2. Note
that this identification is intended mainly for the con-
troller of the receiver, and it is stripped from the mes-
sage, before it is delivered to the component itself. This,
in order to accommodate legacy components, which
would not know what to do with the extra information
added to messages by the law. It is worth pointing out
here that a component written with knowledge of this law
can get the identifying information by explicitly asking
its controller to disclose it. But such disclosure needs to
be permitted by the law under which one operates.}
3) Default inflow control: All inflows of messages are pro-
hibited, [unless permitted by the subordinate module-
law in question]
4) Default outflow control: All outflows of messages
are permitted, [unless prohibited by the subordinate
module-law in question]
5) Default export/import control: All exports and imports
are prohibited, [unless permitted by the subordinate
module-law in question].
6) Default innerFlow control: All message exchanges
between member of a module are permitted, [unless
prohibited by the subordinate module-law in question]
{Discussion: The above four rules establish defaults
controls over inflow, outflow, export/import and inner-
Flow. But they allow individual module-laws to override
these defaults. The rationale of these particular defaults
is as follows: Regarding inflow control, assuming that
relatively few inflows of messages into a module would
end up being allowed, Rule 3 prohibit them all, as a
default. But it enables individual module-laws to permit
arbitrary inflows. The other three default rules above
can be justified by similar consideration. But one can,
of course, design different kinds of default rules.}
2) Module-Laws:: We discuss here a single module-law
LM of some module M . This law is a subordinate to
the system-law LS , which is derived from LS via a delta
∆(LS ,LM ). Below is an informal description of a typical
such delta, distinguishing between two aspects of it: (a)
initialization, to be done upon the adoption of a controller with
LM ; and (b) imposition of control over the flow of messages
into M and from it.
Initialization: Law LM may mandate that a given set of
labels would be added to the state of each component operating
under this law, as the profile of the module. Recall, that as
required by the system-law LS , this profile would be appended
to every message sent by every component of module M , in
order to identify it.
Flow Control: Recall that the system-law LS establishes
defaults for all four types of flows of messages we identified,
allowing module-laws to change these defaults arbitrarily. In
particular, law Ls prohibited all inflows. But law LM can
permit specific types of inflows, as follows: It can permit
certain types of messages from anywhere in the system—
which is equivalent to conventional concept of an interface of
a module. Or, it can permit such messages to come from one
or several modules, which can be specified by their names, or
by their profiles. The defaults of other types of message flow
can be changed in a similar way.
C. About the Enforcement of the law-hierarchy of an MDS:
We have assumed above that all components of S satisfies
the following conditions: (a) they communicate via LGI, and
(b) they operate subject to laws in H . Under this twofold
assumption the law ensemble H is clearly enforced by the
trusted LGI controllers. But how can one ensure that this
assumption is valid?
First note that if part (a) of this assumption is satisfied, than
its part (b) can be established simply by having the system-
law LS require that messages can be received only if they are
sent by component operating under laws that are subordinate to
LS—that is, laws in H . So, if a component chooses to operate
under LGI law that does not belong to H , it will not be able
to communicate with any components operating under H , and
could than be considered not to belong to S. But part (a) of
this assumption is more problematic, because we may have
no control over how a set of distributed software components
communicate with each other.
Assumption (a) can be forced to be satisfied if all compo-
nents of S are on a single Intranet, or on a set of Intranets
managed under a single administrative domains, where one has
control over the local network (or networks) and its firewalls.
This has been demonstrated in [2].
But even when of a given system is dispersed throughout
the Internet, its components may often be virtually compelled
to operate under some law in H , or even under a particular
law L in H . Broadly, this is the case for a component that
needs to communicate with other components, which require
their interlocutors to operate under a given law L, or under
any subordinate law to it. This is so, basically, because one
can detect whether its interlocutor operates under LGI, and
can identify the law under which it operates—this is one of
the essential features of LGI, called “law-based trust” [6].
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D. The Construction of an MDS
The construction of an MDS 〈C,H,E〉 from scratch is fairly
straightforward: One first defines the the modular structure
of the system via the law hierarchy H , and then associates
components with the various modules, by having them adopts
the suitable laws in H . Of course, it may not be that simple,
because one often needs to change the modular structure,
incrementally, during the construction process. We will address
this issue when discussing the evolution of an MDS, in
Section VII. The conversion of a legacy system to an MDS is
an open problem, also discussed in Section VII.
VI. THE COMPLETE MDS MODEL
Our complete MDS model provides the following capa-
bilities omitted, for simplicity, from the basic model: (1)
controlling and reporting the membership of modules; (2)
virtual nesting of modules; (3) allowing modules to overlap;
and (4) implementing crosscutting modules. We introduce
these capabilities below, including their motivation and im-
plementation. It is worth pointing out that these capabilities
do not require any change in the underlying structure of the
basic model, or in the present state of LGI.
A. Controlling and Recording the Membership of Modules:
Note that the basic MDS model provided no means for
imposing constraints on which components can belong to a
given module, and for recording the actual membership of a
given module, at a given moment in time. This is unacceptable
for many reasons. In particular, not being able to constrain
the membership of a module may pose serious security risks,
as it may allow a rogue component to enter some sensitive
module, such as one that implements the monitoring service
of Section II. And not being able to record the membership
of module would make the management of a system very
difficult. However, these capabilities can be provided under the
complete model of MDS, in several ways—such as described
below.
Controlling the Membership of a Module: Suppose that
each component of a given system S has a private key, and
that there is a certification authority (CA) that provides each
component with a digital certificate that identifies its unique
name (unique with respect to system S), and the module
(or modules) to which it is allowed to belong. Under this
condition, the module-law of a given module M can be written
to require such a certificate upon the adoption of this law, and
to refuse to be adopted if the right certificate is not presented.
In fact, such control over membership may be made into
a system regularity, if the above is done not by individual
component-laws but in the system-law LS .
Recording the Membership of Modules: Suppose that
a given system employs a server—called system registry—to
maintain the list of system components, each identified by its
name, IP address, and by the module (or modules) to which
it belong. This server can be fed with the required informa-
tion, by having the system-law LS mandate that whenever a
components adopts a controller under a given component-law,
a message will be sent automatically to the registry, with its
identification, and with the name of the module it operating
from.
B. Virtual Nesting of Modules Under MDS:
Modules can be nested under MDS, simply by extending
the depth of the conformance hierarchy of laws H to more
then 2, as depicted by dashed lines in Figure 3. Of course,
we do not mean physical nesting, but a logical one, in terms
of the constraints imposed on the messages that can flow into
and out of the components of the nested modules.
For example, consider a module M defined by law LM ,
anywhere in H below LS , and a module M ′ defined by law
LM ′ subordinate to LM . Given the nature of conformance
under LGI, the components of M ′ operate under the same
restrictions on their communication, as the components of
M itself—unless LM permit its subordinates laws to devi-
ate from it in some sense. Suppose, in particular, that LM
permit its subordinate laws to strengthen (but not weaken) its
own constraints on communication. Then LM ′ may impose
additional constraints on how its own components interact
with the rest of the system. The potential benefits of such
an hierarchical organization of modules, particularly for very
large and complex systems, seems self evident.
It is worth pointing out that this concept of nesting enables
us to view the entire system as a single universal module,
defined by the system-law LS of H , which has the other
modules nested within it.
C. The Ability of Modules to Overlap:
Modules can overlap in the sense that a single component
may belong to several modules. This can be done by a
component simply by adopting several LGI controllers, under
several different module-laws. This basic capability of LGI
may be useful for several reasons, the following is of them;
another reason is presented in Section VI-D, below.
Consider a web server that provides several different ser-
vices. Such services may need to belong to different mod-
ules, because they may need to interact with different set of
components, and may require different inflow, outflow and
export/import controls. This is possible to do with the overlap
capability.
D. Crosscutting Modules:
The ability of components of an MDS to belong to several
modules enables the implementation of a distributed version
of crosscutting modules, thus extending to open distributed
systems an important concept introduced under aspect oriented
programming AOP [3]. We illustrate this capability of MDS
with the following example.
Consider an MDS-based system S in which several com-
ponents that belong to several different modules engage in
sending purchase orders (POs) to Internet cites outside of S.
And suppose that the sending of POs is required to comply
with a given system wide protocol that involves an approval
workflow and logging of the POs themselves. Normally one
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would have to program this protocol into every component that
issues POs—which is laborious and error prone process. But
we can ensure that this protocol is observed for sending POs,
by anybody who does it, simply by localizing the sending of
POs in a single, crosscutting module, say P . This can be done
as follows.
First, we write a module-law LP that enforces the required
protocol, for every PO being sent. Second, we have to write
the root law LS so that it prohibits the sending of POs
from anywhere, except from module P . This would force
components that need to send POs to enter module P—in
addition to their native module—by adopting its law LP .
Related Work: It should be pointed out that this is not
the first implementation of crosscutting concerns in distributed
system. In particular, the DaDO system [10] implemented such
concerns by planting appropriate mediators, called adaplets, in
the code of the relevant components. Adaplets are analogous
to our controllers with specific laws. But planting them into
the code of the various components, is overly laborious and
unsafe. In any case, unlike in DaDO, the crosscutting concerns
under MDS are simply an integral part of the more general
concept of modularization.
VII. SOME OPEN PROBLEMS
Although the MDS model can be used in its present
form, it raises several issues that require further research and
experimentation. Two such open issues are presented below.
(1) The Evolution of an MDS:: Both the base system
of an MDS S = 〈C,H,E〉, (i.e., the code of the set of
components C of S), and its modular structure defined by H ,
are bound to evolve. The evolution of the code of the system
presents no new problems under MDS. Quite the contrary, such
evolution becomes safer, because no changes in the code can
violate the constraints imposed by the modular structure H .
This is, in fact, one of the most significant and advantageous
aspects of the concept of MDS. However, the evolution of
H , which defines the modular structure of S, confronts the
following presents difficulties: (1) the potentially disruptive
effect that a change of H may have on the system governed
by it; and (2) the difficulties in carrying out changes of non-
leaf laws that belong to the law-hierarchy H (note that changes
in leaf laws of H present no difficulty.)
(2) Evaluation of the Potential Impact of MDS on the
Engineering of Distributed Systems:: The model of MDS
introduce here has been tested experimentally on a couple of
small systems, as a proof of concept. But the real usefulness of
MDS, and its potential impact on the engineering of distributed
system, cannot be validated without applying it to large,
complex and open distributed system. This calls for three
kinds of experiments: (a) constructing a complex MDS from
scratch; (b) converting a large and complex legacy system to
an MDS; and (c) subjecting one of such systems to a process
of evolution. Such experiments are yet to be done.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have introduced the concept of modular distributed
system, composed of what we have called distributed modules.
Each such module is comprised of a set of one or more
distributed components, whose communication with other
modules of that system, and with the outside, is tightly circum-
scribed. In other words, an MDS erects virtual, selectively per-
meable, boundaries between groups of components dispersed
over the Internet. This modular structure is established via a
decentralized middleware, and is, therefore very scalable.
This concept is inspired by modularization in local (non-
distributed) systems, and it is similar to it in that it provides
for hiding. But MDS has several important features that
are rarely, if ever, supported by conventional modularization.
These include constraints on the ability of the body of a
module to send messages to other modules, or to the outside
of the system; the ability of different modules to overlap; and
the ability to construct crosscutting modules.
Although the full evaluation of the potential impact of the
MDS model has not been done yet, this impact is expected to
be substantial, particularly once the open problems presented
in Section VII are solved.
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